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Liar! Liar? The Defamatory Impact of 
“Liar” in the Modern World 
Roy S. Gutterman* 
Calling someone a liar is an age-old epithet. Depending on the con-
text, calling someone a liar could be defamatory, causing harm to a repu-
tation. But, more often than not, calling someone a liar may be simply 
an expression of opinion. In some settings, litigation surrounding the 
publication also implicates the First Amendment. In recent years, sever-
al courts have weighed in on this issue, some with conflicting outcomes. 
This Article examines whether accusations of dishonesty or lying in a 
modern media world has a defamatory impact. 
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“Talk is cheap and lies are expensive.”  
   – Billie Joe Armstrong1 
 
Accusations of dishonesty or lying, or the act of calling some-
one a liar are an epithet for the ages. Ordinarily, an insult, even one 
as timeless as liar, would be viewed simply as an insult, not worthy 
of legal liability. But the impact of imputing dishonesty by calling 
someone a liar could have legal consequences under the tort of de-
famation. For centuries, defamation law has tested the harm to a 
person’s reputation after the person is branded a liar, and the stan-
dards for liability, harm, and the contextual meaning of the epithet 
are, at best, inconsistent and often considered murky. Precedent 
testing the liar epithet lacks clear and consistent application across 
courts and jurisdictions. 
The tort liability surrounding the word “liar” has been litigated 
in recent years with mixed and conflicting court rulings. Further-
more, during the 2016 presidential primary campaign, labeling op-
ponents liars practically became a plank in the candidates’ political 
platforms.2 Then-presidential candidate Donald Trump even proc-
laimed that he wanted to change libel laws to make them more 
amenable for public figure plaintiffs.3 Because of current standards 
under the First Amendment, a political candidate would hardly 
have a leg to stand on in court by pressing a defamation claim for 
being branded a liar on the campaign trail.4 While this brought the 
                                                                                                                            
1 GREEN DAY, Walking Contradiction, on INSOMNIAC (Reprise Records 1995). 
2 Editorial, The Party of Trump and Path Forward for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/opinion/the-party-of-trump-and-the-path-
forward-for-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/P93A-AV65]; Katie Zezima, Liar, Liar: A 




3 Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump Wrong that New York Times Can’t Be Sued for a ‘Story 
that They Know Is False,’ POLITIFACT (Mar. 1, 2016, 1:40 PM), http:// 
www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/mar/01/donald-trump/donald-
trump-wrong-ny-times-cant-be-sued-story-the/ [https://perma.cc/7B59-8XH3]. 
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).  
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discussion of libel law to the forefront of public discourse (at least 
for a news cycle), it does little to clarify the standards or the pub-
lic’s understanding of defamation law. 
Outside the political world, though, the question of whether 
calling someone a liar is defamatory is more in flux. Three recent 
lawsuits emanating from the Bill Cosby sexual assault allegations 
have put “liars” and accusations of lying in play.5 One recent case 
involving a prominent college basketball coach stands out as an ex-
ample of how courts can apply, or misapply, a range of precedent 
regarding the term liar.6 
Calling someone a liar has never been a nice thing to say. As an 
insult, it immediately casts doubt on every aspect of the target’s 
integrity, self-worth, and being. Insults, while not endearing, do not 
necessarily rise to the level of defamation.7 The tort of defamation 
provides a civil remedy to protect people from false statements that 
may harm one’s reputation.8 Reputational protection has ancient 
roots, and tort law in a civil society provides a financial remedy to 
those whose reputations have been harmed by false statements.9 
Much like humanity itself, the law of defamation has evolved and 
will continue to develop.10 However, calling someone a liar strad-
                                                                                                                            
5 See Hill v. Cosby, 15-CV-1658, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 
2016), aff’d, No. 16-1362, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22199 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2016); 
Complaint at 4, Green v. Cosby, 99 F. Supp. 3d 223 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 14-30211-
MGM); Amended Complaint at 12–15, Costand v. Cosby, 232 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Pa. 
2006) (No. 05-CV-1099) (seeking damages for defamation and defamation per se in count 
four of the complaint); see also Sydney Ember & Graham Bowley, Defamation Suits 
Against Cosby Point to Peril of Belittling Accusers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/business/media/defamation-suits-against-cosby-
point-to-peril-of-belittling-accusers.html [https://perma.cc/GH7U-KYED]. 
6 See Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262, 271–73 (2014). 
7 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 
§ 2.4 (4th ed. 2010) (“The distinction between what is merely unflattering, insulting, or 
derogatory and what will actually injure reputation is thus crucial. People are expected to 
be sufficiently hardy to withstand the occasional jibe or disparaging remark; if each such 
statement gave rise to a cause of action, courts would have time for little but defamation 
suits.”). 
8 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 772 (5th ed. 
1984). 
9 Id. (noting the tort provided an alternative to duels as a remedy for an offended party 
to repair a reputation). 
10 See infra Section I.A. 
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dles the line between actionable defamation and a statement that 
may be immunized by at least the opinion privilege.11 
Falsity is the most basic element of defamation.12 In some set-
tings, calling someone a liar may be a clear matter of fact, which 
could lead to liability.13 In other settings, this epithet may be more 
of a term of art, protected by the opinion privilege.14 In the quarter-
century since the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the liability of 
publishing that someone is a liar, there has been no shortage of liti-
gation testing this issue.15 More recently, a spate of high-profile 
cases has emerged to test this concept.16 In more than a couple cas-
es, the plaintiffs appear to use defamation law, specifically litigating 
the allegation of lying, to circumvent both civil and criminal sta-
tutes of limitations in the underlying disputes.17 
This Article analyzes whether in our contemporary world call-
ing someone a liar has the same defamatory impact it once had. 
Part I reviews defamation law and considers what it means to be 
called a liar. Part II analyzes the cases in which courts have ex-
amined the defamatory impact of the “liar” accusation, paying par-
ticular attention to the landmark Milkovich v. Lorain Journal case. 
Part II also examines two recent controversies litigating the liar epi-
thet as an end-run around expired statutes of limitations. Finally, 
Part III discusses how these defamation issues are handled in mod-
ern contexts and in social media. 
                                                                                                                            
11 See infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
13 SACK, supra note 7, § 2.4.7. 
14 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that a statement that 
cannot be proven either true or false may not be held as defamatory). 
15 See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S.Ct 852 (2014); Tory v. Cochran, 544 
U.S. 734 (2005); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Milkovich, 
497 U.S. at 1; Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Herbert v. Lando, 
441 U.S. 153 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 
448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
16 See cases cited supra notes 5–6. 
17 See id. 
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I. FALSITY, HONESTY, AND LIABILITY 
A. The Law of Defamation and Protecting Reputation 
The twin torts of defamation are libel and slander.18 As a matter 
of state law, defamation is comprised of four elements: an unprivi-
leged false published statement of fact about the plaintiff that caus-
es harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.19 The standard of proof de-
pends on the plaintiff’s status in the community: A private figure 
simply must prove that the statements were published with a de-
gree of negligence, whereas a public official (someone who works 
for government or a public figure) must prove that the statements 
were published with actual malice, which requires knowledge of 
their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.20 
The effects of a defamatory statement include public contempt, 
ridicule, aversion, and disgrace.21 According to William L. Prosser 
and W. Page Keeton, who wrote the leading treatise on torts, at 
common law, “[d]efamation is rather that which tends to injure 
‘reputation’ in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, 
goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite 
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against 
him.”22 “Personal disgrace” is another important element and all 
defamation claims must be adjudged by a “reasonable person.”23 
But what constitutes personal disgrace is relative, much like lan-
guage itself. As language and societal standards evolve, one scholar 
described defamation as a “distinctly sociological tort.”24 In his 
                                                                                                                            
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
19 Id.; see also Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and 
the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 720–21 (1986). Post notes that defamation law 
protects reputation as a property right, assigning a civil financial remedy to a plaintiff’s 
dignity and honor: “Our own social world contains important elements of both market 
and communitarian societies. If these tensions resolve themselves, one can expect the 
contours of defamation law to become clearer and its doctrines more internally 
consistent.” Id. 
20 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
21 See Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996). 
22 KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 773. 
23 Id. at 774–75, 777. 
24 Jerome K. Skolnick, Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
677, 677 (1986) (“As a sociological tort defamation also invites a more comprehensive 
sociological analysis . . . .”). 
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update to a 1940s press law guide, a noted media lawyer wrote: De-
termining defamatory meaning “is not limited to orthodox dictio-
nary definition. It hinges also upon the temper of the times, collo-
quialisms, connotations, previous and subsequent articles or broad-
casts, and matters of common knowledge in the circulation or lis-
tening area.”25 
For decades (and, perhaps, centuries), plaintiffs had a strong 
cause of action for defamation if a newspaper referred to the plain-
tiff as homosexual. However, today, in most states such a case 
would not automatically give rise to a libel per se claim.26 Similarly, 
falsely identifying a white person as African-American or mixed-
race was at one time an actionable libel.27 Throughout the Red 
Scare and well into the Cold War, falsely identifying someone as a 
Communist could be defamatory.28 The false allegations of being a 
                                                                                                                            
25 PAUL P. ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY 14 (3d. ed. 1966). Later, in his chapter of libel per se, 
Ashley provided a nearly seven-page list of terms and expressions which could be libel per 
se, including such terms as “atheist, Communist, nudist, subversive, ambulance chaser, 
humbug, sharp dealing, booze hound, scab, [and] horse thief,” among others. Id. at 19–25. 
26 See Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[Statements 
imputing homosexuality are] not defamatory per se merely because they impute 
homosexuality . . . .They are, however, nonetheless susceptible to a defamatory 
meaning.”); Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D. Mass. 2004) (“If this 
[c]ourt were to agree that calling someone a homosexual is defamatory per se—it would, 
in effect, validate that sentiment and legitimize relegating homosexuals to second-class 
status.”); see also Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still 
Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 527, 527 (2012); Robert 
Richards, Gay Labeling and Defamation Law: Have Attitudes Toward Homosexuality 
Changed Enough to Modify Reputational Torts?, 18 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 349, 365 
(2010). 
27 Bowen v. Indep. Publ’g Co., 96 S.E.2d 566, 513 (S.C. 1957) (“Although to publish in 
a newspaper of a white woman that she is a Negro imputes no mental, moral or physical 
fault for which she may justly be held accountable to public opinion, yet in view of the 
social habits and customs deep-rooted in this [s]tate, such publication is calculated to 
affect her standing in society and to injure her in the estimation of her friends and 
acquaintances. That such a publication is libelous per se is supported by the very great 
weight of authority.”); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637, 640–41 (S.C. 1905). 
(“We therefore hold that these three amendments to the Federal Constitution have not 
destroyed the law of this state which makes the publication of a white man as a negro 
anything but libel.”); see also Natchez Times Publ’g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So.2d 681, 683–
84 (Miss. 1954). 
28 See Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945); see also 
ROBERT H. PHELPS & E. DOUGLAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 68 
(Macmillan 1966) (“When Americans and Russians were allies, a report that a man was a 
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“Leninist” and “Communist” played a prominent role in the 
landmark defamation case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.29 In his own 
memoir of the libel case, Elmer Gertz, a Chicago lawyer who 
played a relatively minor role in a separate civil action in a police 
brutality case, wrote: “As will appear presently, I filed suit against 
Robert Welch, Inc., the parent organization of American Opinion, 
charging that it had defamed me by publishing harmful lies impugn-
ing my reputation and patriotism.”30 Even descriptions of both po-
verty31 and extreme wealth,32 at various times, generated defama-
tion claims; whereas currently, a plaintiff who is accused of either 
may have a difficult time making a prima facie case.33 
Perhaps just as antiquated as misidentifying someone in one of 
the aforementioned areas are the descriptions of the defamatory 
effect itself. One of the most famous, and widely cited cases on the 
impact of a defamatory statement is Kimmerle v. New York Evening 
Journal, Inc., which provided a laundry list of words which expose 
someone “to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, 
contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace or 
to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking per-
sons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly inter-
course in society.”34 In the twenty-first century, obloquy, 35 con-
                                                                                                                            
communist was held nonlibelous . . . . Now the law is settled, at least for a time, that 
charges of Communist affiliation are libelous.”). 
29 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
30 ELMER GERTZ, GERTZ V. ROBERT WELCH, INC.—THE STORY OF A LANDMARK LIBEL 
CASE 6 (1992). Gertz also noted that the Birchers were “much too quick and careless in 
calling people Communists or dupes of Communists. Of course, I was not the sole victim 
of this looseness of terminology.” Id. at 45. 
31 Martin v. Press Publ’g Co., 93 A.D. 531, 531 (N.Y. 1904). Here, plaintiff was an 
educated family man who was accused of being “too poor” and unable to provide for his 
family. Id. at 531. The court held these statements were actionable because they “exposed 
the person referred to therein to public ridicule and tended to abridge his comfort and to 
injuriously alter his station in society and was, consequently, libelous per se.” Id. at 532. 
32 See Woolworth v. Star Co., 97 A.D. 525, 526–27 (N.Y. 1904). 
33 See Trump v. O’Brien, 29 A.3d 1090, 1097 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) 
(affirming dismissal of defamation claims against author who essentially referred to 
businessman as a millionaire rather than a billionaire because the plaintiff was unable to 
establish publisher acted with actual malice). 
34 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933). 
35 For example, “obloquy” is still on the books in California’s statute defining 
defamation, but the law was first enacted in 1872. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2016); 
see also Bettner v. Holt, 11 P. 713, 716 (Cal. 1886) (“To expose one to obloquy is to expose 
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tumely,36 and odium37 are not words that frequently find their way 
into common parlance. Though these words do find a place in 
modern defamation cases, they are most often tacked on as part of 
the list of the harm caused by the defamatory statement, usually in 
citations to Kimmerle.38 The four well-defined categories of defa-
mation per se find various formulations embedded in state law.39  
Generally speaking, the categories are: imputing crime, imputing 
dishonesty or incompetence in business or trade, imputing a loath-
some disease (sexually transmitted infection, HIV, or leprosy), and 
imputing unchastity of a woman.40 
Similarly, there are specific words and phrases whose very ut-
terances can trigger reputational harm. This issue was litigated all 
the way to the Supreme Court.41 For example, “blackmail”42 and 
“Southern [law] violator”43 were the centerpiece allegations in two 
landmark cases. Generally, the actionability of these types of words 
depends not only on the language used, but the context as well. 
However, there is perhaps no single epithet that causes more con-
sternation than the word “liar.” 
                                                                                                                            
him to censure and reproach as the latter terms are synonymous with the word 
‘obloquy.’”). 
36 See Schaecher v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589, 594 (Va. 2015) (stating that defamatory 
language “tends to injure one’s reputation in the common estimation of mankind, to 
throw contumely, shame, or disgrace upon him . . .” (quoting Moss v. Harwood, 102 Va. 
386, 387 (1904))). 
37 See White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266, 283 (1845) (“The paper is actionable on its face, 
as it charges the plaintiff with things which are calculated to bring public odium upon him: 
such as ‘descending to the lowest means.’”); see also Harris v. Minvielle, 19 So. 925, 926 
(La. 1896) (“He claims of the defendant the sum of $2,500 for the actual loss and damage 
he has suffered by direct injury to his commercial business through the instrumentality of 
the slander thus circulated . . . by reason of the mortification, annoyance, public 
contempt, and odium it has occasioned on him . . . .”). 
38 See generally Karedes v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 423 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2005); Celle 
v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000). 
39 SACK, supra note 7, §§ 2.3–2.4.1. 
40 NEIL J. ROSINI, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LIBEL LAW 8–9 (1991). 
41 Other categories such as hate speech or fighting words could cause similar rancor, 
but fall outside the scope of this research, primarily because these categories, while 
potentially punishable through criminal law, are not regarded as defamatory. See generally 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568 (1942). 
42 Greenbelt Co-op Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7–8 (1970). 
43 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–58 (1964). 
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B. The Importance of Being Honest 
Before delving into the actionability of the word liar, a look at 
honesty is in order. The need for truth, and the importance of hav-
ing a reputation for being truthful—or, in the converse, of being a 
liar—is so high that some philosophers, such as Sissela Bok, believe 
that truth-telling keeps civilization from imploding.44 In her semin-
al book Lying, Bok wrote that society depends on language and lan-
guage requires truth: 
Were all statements randomly truthful or deceptive, 
action and choice would be undermined from the 
outset. There must be a minimal degree of trust in 
communication for language and to be more than 
stabs in the dark. This is why some level of truthful-
ness has always been seen as essential to human so-
ciety, no matter how deficient the observance of 
other moral principles.45 
Lying is wrapped up in both ethics and morality—good and 
bad, honest and dishonest.46 Thomas Carson, a professor of philos-
ophy, speaks of a “warranty” of truth as a guarantee, or even a 
promise, for truth.47 Truth also underpins and guarantees (or aims 
to guarantee) honesty in certain professions, such as in the occupa-
tions of lawyers, doctors, architects, and other fiduciaries.48 “Ho-
nesty is generally regarded as a cardinal virtue, and calling someone 
a ‘dishonest person’ is generally taken to be a severe criticism or 
condemnation of the person,” Carson wrote.49 
From the Bible to Disney,50 the ethical and moral judgments at-
tached to the term liar paint quite a negative impression for the 
                                                                                                                            
44 SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 19 (Pantheon 
Books 1978). 
45 Id. at 18. 
46 THOMAS CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 71 (2010). 
47 Id. at 25. 
48 Id. at 202–03. 
49 Id. at 257. 
50 M. HIRSH GOLDBERG, THE BOOK OF LIES: SCHEMES, SCAMS, FAKES, AND FRAUDS 
THAT HAVE CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY AND AFFECT OUR DAILY LIVES 15, 27 
(1990) (“Lying is such a part of the fabric of our lives that even the Bible story of the 
beginning of humanity is filled with lies told by its three protagonists.”). 
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perniciousness of lies, lying, and dishonesty.51 Our predilection for 
dishonesty has been ridiculed, 52 mocked, and satirized,53 but is also 
of such import that calling someone a liar has taken on legal ramifi-
cations through libel law. 
C. Liar and Legal Liability? 
American courts have had difficulty with liability surrounding 
allegations of lying for centuries. In 1793, a Connecticut circuit 
court could not ascertain the defamatory impact of the statement: 
“Captain Riggs is a damned liar and a rogue, and I can prove it.”54 
In this case, the defendant admitted to libel, and the trial court or-
dered a one-pound payment to the plaintiff.55 However, the appel-
late court was unable to determine whether the case was properly 
pleaded in either law or fact, and avoided answering the question 
with certitude.56 
Later, in the early 1800s, a Boston man was convicted and sen-
tenced to two months in prison for posting statements calling an 
auctioneer a “liar, a scoundrel, a cheat and a swindler.”57 Con-
                                                                                                                            
51 RALPH KEYES, THE POST-TRUTH ERA: DISHONESTY AND DECEPTION IN 
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 27 (2004) (“All societies must reconcile the fact that lying is 
socially toxic with the fact that nearly all their members engage in this practice. Every 
belief system does its best to regulate dishonesty with taboos, sanctions, and norms. Few 
such systems claim that every lie is always wrong. This would put them too far out of 
synch with facts on the ground. Therefore a major task for all belief systems has been to 
determine when it’s permissible to tell a lie.”). 
52 GOLDBERG, supra note 50, at 22 (“Lying is so prevalent that it has its own day—
April Fools’ Day.”). 
53 For example, comedian Stephen Colbert was so skeptical and disdainful of dishonest 
claims by politicians that he coined the term “truthiness,” which a year later became the 
“word of the year.” See Andrew Adam Newman, How Dictionaries Define Publicity: The 
Word of the Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/ 
business/media/10oxford.html [https://perma.cc/P6AE-NDA4]; Alessandra Stanley, 
Bringing Out the Absurdity of the News, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2005), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2005/10/25/arts/television/bringing-out-the-absurdity-of-the-
news.html [https://perma.cc/G2EB-TP9V]. 
54 Kelly v. Riggs, 2 Root 13, 13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1793). 
55 Id. at 13. 
56 Id. at 14. 
57 Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 170 (1808) (“The publication of a libel 
maliciously with intent to defame, whether it be true or not, is clearly an offense against 
law, on sound principles, which must be adhered to, so long as the restraint of all 
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versely, a Pennsylvania judge in 1812 wrote: “Every one knows that 
to say of a man that he is a rogue or a liar, is not actionable.”58 A 
Virginia court in 1850 ruled the same way.59 On the other hand, 
during the same period, a North Carolina doctor’s $200 award of 
damages was upheld in a slander case in which he was called a 
liar.60 In Indiana, a letter declaring that a man was “a grand liar and 
a grand rascal, and deserve to come to the whipping-post or gal-
lows” was held to be defamatory.61 And, a Maryland court ruled 
that mitigating evidence may be admitted in defense of a libel case 
surrounding a statement that plaintiff was “a degraded scoundrel, 
liar and blackguard.”62 
Prosser and Keeton cited a handful of ancient and conflicting 
cases where questions of honesty were at issue.63 For example, a 
1900 Georgia newspaper article that implied that a businessman 
was a liar was improperly dismissed,64 with the Georgia Supreme 
Court holding: “It is difficult for us to imagine what words would 
more fully expose a man to public contempt than to publish him as 
being a liar.”65 Meanwhile, the Montana Supreme Court wrestled 
with whether calling a teacher a liar could be libel per se,66 and a 
                                                                                                                            
tendencies to the breach of the public peace, and to private animosity and revenge, is 
salutary to the commonwealth.”). 
58 M’Clurg v. Ross, 5 Binn. 218, 219 (Pa. 1812). 
59 Moseley v. Moss, 47 Va. 534, 538 (1850) (“Thus it is not actionable to call a man a 
villain, cheat, rascal, liar, coward or ruffian . . . where such defamation bears only on the 
feelings or general standing or reputation of the party implicated, and the misconduct 
imputed has not been made punishable by statute.”). 
60 Dudley v. Robinson, 24 N.C. 141, 143–44 (1841). 
61 McCoombs v. Tuttle, 5 Blackf. 431, 431 (Ind. 1840). 
62 Davis v. Griffith, 4 G. & J. 342, 342 (Md. 1832). 
63 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 771–85. 
64 Colvard v. Black, 36 S.E. 80 (Ga. 1900). This case involved a newspaper article 
entitled “A Dirty Lie Nailed” about the death of an unnamed man on a train passing 
through Georgia. Id. at 81. The court wrote: “[T]he article did, in effect, accuse 
petitioner of willfully lying, and was prepared and published for the purpose of exposing 
him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, to cause his defeat for the legislature, and 
that said article did cause such defeat.” Id. 
65 Id. at 82. The court cited a case decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in which 
the court concluded that it was libelous to call someone a liar. See id. (citing Hake v. 
Brames, 95 Ind. 161 (1884)). 
66 Paxton v. Woodward, 78 P. 215 (Mont. 1904). The demand for $5,000 in damages 
had been thrown out at trial. Id. at 216–217. The court wrestled with whether the 
published statements could be libel per se—whether calling a teacher a liar was of such 
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Louisiana doctor recovered $5,000 (later reduced to $500) for be-
ing branded a liar.67 In another case, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
concluded that a libel claim made by a candidate for county sheriff 
should have been sent to a jury.68 
In his treatise on defamation, Judge Robert D. Sack articulated 
this range of precedent and the ensuing confusion surrounding the 
issue, speaking directly to the question: 
The terms “lie” and “liar” are frequently used to 
characterize statements with which the speaker 
vehemently disagrees. If in context the words mean 
that the defendant disapproves, it is a protected epi-
thet. If it literally implies that the plaintiff made a 
specific assertion or series of assertions knowing 
them to be false, it may be actionable.69 
                                                                                                                            
weight that it injured him in his profession. Id. at 217. The article called him a “common 
liar.” Id. at 216. The issue on appeal focused on a demurrer at trial. The court held: While 
the written charge, “We knew that Paxton was a man of many attainments, but did not 
know that he was a common liar before,” is in its nature, libelous per se, and needs no 
colloquium or innuendo to illustrate its application or meaning, and the vice imputed to 
plaintiff by the words standing alone is unqualified, and as broad as language can make it, 
yet, if the defamatory language is connected with other language which limits or affects its 
meaning, or might tend to mitigate the damage, its construction must be in relation to 
such other language, and in arriving at the sense . . . in part at least, to certain statements 
contained in the Chronicle. Id. (emphasis added). 
67 Smith v. Lyon, 77 So. 896, 904 (La. 1918). The doctor recovered $2,500 for libel 
damages following a comment that called him “an assassin of character, a liar, and 
unworthy of the respect and esteem of decent and fair-minded people.” Id. Eight months 
later, the Louisiana Supreme Court reduced the damages to $500 because the initial 
award was later deemed to be excessive. Id. 
68 Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 N.W. 365, 367 (Iowa 1905). In this case, the court wrote: 
Applying the accepted definition of libel, it is difficult to conceive of any publication more 
likely to provoke the victim to wrath, or expose him to public hatred and distrust, or to 
deprive him of the benefit of public confidence, than to publish abroad that he is a 
common liar whose word, even under the solemnity of an oath, will not be believed by his 
acquaintances. Id. Derogatory comments published in the heat of a county sheriff race 
may be defamatory either as libel per se if the elements of the tort are met, but it should 
have been submitted to a jury. Id. “It is true that, ordinarily, oral words which impute to 
another a criminal disposition or charge him with being notoriously untruthful or 
unworthy of the respect and confidence of his neighbors are not actionable, but such 
imputations written and published are universally held to constitute a libel per se,” the 
court wrote. Id. (emphasis added). 
69 SACK, supra note 7, § 2.4.7. 
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II. IS THIS THE LESSON . . . ? 
A. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 
The modern law on defamation coalesces around the Supreme 
Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the subse-
quent cases often referred to as the Times’  “progeny.”70 In one of 
the progeny cases, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the legal ques-
tion focused on whether calling someone a liar was defamatory.71 
This case pitted a legendary Ohio high school wrestling coach 
against a small daily newspaper in litigation that spanned nearly 
fifteen years.72 The sports columnist wrote that Coach Michael 
Milkovich had lied under oath during a hearing.73 Under the head-
line “Maple beat the law with the ‘big lie,’” the columnist wrote: 
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way 
out. . . . Anyone who attended the meet, whether he 
be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial ob-
server, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott 
lied at the hearing after each having given his so-
lemn oath to tell the truth.74 
The column wove a theme of pedagogy throughout the piece, 
with references that the alleged lies perpetrated by school officials 
would leave students with the wrong “lesson.”75 In his conclusion, 
the columnist posited a rhetorical question about lying and disho-
nesty: “Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learn-
ing from their high school administrators and coaches?”76 
                                                                                                                            
70 C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of 
Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 240, 281 
(1993) (“We submit that Masson and Milkovich, when taken together, provide compelling 
support for our central proposition—that every defamation action governed by New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan contemplates a threshold, constitutional inquiry by the court 
concerning whether the publication at issue is reasonably capable of bearing a false, 
defamatory meaning.”). 
71 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
72 Id. at 3. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 4–5 (reprinting column from trial record). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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The underlying facts and the tortuous fifteen-year procedural 
history show the complicated nature of the case and how courts 
wrestle (literally and figuratively) with the question of whether 
such statements could be defamatory.77 The defamatory piece was 
actually a sports column written by columnist Ted Diadiun in The 
News Herald, a small daily newspaper in suburban Cleveland, 
Ohio.78 Diadiun had covered the 1974 high school wrestling meet 
between Maple Heights and Mentor High Schools, which devolved 
into a melee in which several people were injured.79 Subsequently, 
the Ohio High School Athletic Association held a hearing with tes-
timony from Maple Heights Coach Milkovich and Superintendent 
H. Don Scott.80 The ensuing controversy included probation for 
the team, suspension from the next year’s state tournament, a cen-
sure for Milkovich for his role in the melee, and a civil lawsuit that 
parents brought against the state athletic association.81 
The defamation claim—libel per se—focused on lying, which 
in this case would have encompassed lying under oath in a judicial 
proceeding.82 Milkovich argued that the column accused him of 
committing the crime of perjury, which was “an indictable offense 
in the state of Ohio, and damaged [the] plaintiff directly in his life-
time occupation of coach and teacher.”83 The defamation 
precedent, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., as well as Superintendent 
Scott’s separate libel lawsuit, added additional wrinkles to the case 
                                                                                                                            
77 See generally DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 8:22 (1993). 
78 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 4. The named defendant, the Lorain Journal, was the parent 
company for the News-Herald. 
79 Id. at 3–4. 
80 Id. at 4. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 6–7; see also Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (Ohio 1984) 
(“The plain import of the author’s assertions is that Milkovich, inter alia, committed the 
crime of perjury in a court of law.”), overruled by Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 
(Ohio 1986). 
83 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 7. Perjury is defined as: “The willful assertion as to a matter of 
fact, opinion, belief or knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his 
evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, 
whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such 
assertion being material to the issue or point of inquiry and known to such witness to be 
false, and intended by him to mislead the court, jury, or person holding the proceeding.” 
Perjury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1995). 
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because the plaintiffs’ status as public figures also came into play.84 
To further complicate the analysis regarding opinion, a highly in-
fluential decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, Ollman v. Evans, was decided in 1984.85 
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the narrow 
question of the defamatory impact of calling someone a liar was ec-
lipsed by the broader question of whether there should be a whole-
sale privilege for opinion.86 In tracing not only the meaning of de-
famation and the history of defamation, including an oft-cited pas-
sage from Shakespeare’s Othello, the Court delved into defenses 
including actual malice under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and 
later Gertz, as well as fair comment.87 The bulk of Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist’s analysis rests on determining whether a 
statement is fact or opinion.88 The dispositive factor in the analysis 
is whether the speaker makes a statement based on some undis-
closed fact or facts.89 Thus, the Court illustrated that the state-
ment, “In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” is really not any differ-
ent than stating, “Jones is a liar.”90 “Simply couching such state-
ments in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and 
the statement . . . can cause as much damage to reputation as the 
statement, ‘Jones is a liar.’”91 
To clarify this analysis, the Court provided three mechanisms, 
based on existing precedent, to determine whether a statement 
could be actionable as a statement of fact or protected as pure opi-
nions. First, the Court said that a statement on matters of public 
                                                                                                                            
84 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 7 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). 
85 See 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Ollman court developed a four-prong 
analysis to decide if a statement is protected as pure opinion or actionable as defamation: 
(1) the specific language used, (2) whether it is verifiable, (3) the general context, and (4) 
the broader context. Id. 
86 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 10, 18. 
87 Id. at 11–18. Fair comment is a common law qualified privilege also known as the 
critic’s privilege, which indemnifies writers for writing bona fide critiques. See SACK, 
supra note 7, §§ 4.2.1–4.2.2. 
88 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18–22. 
89 Id. at 18–19. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 19. 
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concern must be provably false to be defamatory.92 Second, state-
ments that no reasonable person could mistake for fact or “imagin-
ative expression” or “rhetorical hyperbole” cannot be actionable.93 
And, third, as a matter of public concern, a statement that “rea-
sonably implies false and defamatory facts regarding public fig-
ures,” made with actual malice, can be actionable.94  
Thus, the Court held that a “reasonable factfinder” could de-
termine that the published allegations in the column could be de-
famatory.95 The specific language in the column was not “loose, 
figurative, or hyperbolic language” and did more than simply imply 
that Milkovich committed perjury.96 The Court held: 
We also think the connotation that petitioner com-
mitted perjury is sufficiently factual to be suscepti-
ble of being proved true or false. A determination 
whether petitioner lied in this instance can be made 
on a core of objective evidence by comparing, inter 
alia, petitioner’s testimony before the [Ohio High 
School Athletic Association] board with his subse-
quent testimony before the trial court.97 
In the twenty-five years since the Milkovich decision, scholars 
have criticized the precedent for not clarifying the standards for 
determining whether a statement is protected opinion or actiona-
ble.98 Furthermore, a recent analysis of the case called it “deeply 
                                                                                                                            
92 Id. at 19–20. This is the rationale under Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 
(1986). In Milkovich, the court stated: “Hepps ensures that a statement of opinion relating 
to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation 
will receive full constitutional protection.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. 
93 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. The Court applied the Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell 
rationale from a previous line of cases. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Co-op. Publ’g Ass’n v. 
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). 
94 Milkovich, 497 U.S at 20–21 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 
U.S. 485 (1984); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964)). 
95 Id. at 21. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 21–22. 
98 The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 219, 226–27 (1990) 
(“The Milkovich Court missed an opportunity to alleviate the uncertainty surrounding 
[F]irst [A]mendment protection for opinion. Rather than adopt a uniform test to 
determine when a statement is an actionable assertion of fact, the Court articulated vague 
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and unworkably confused.”99 The question of whether a statement 
is opinion or fact, particularly that in which a plaintiff’s honesty 
and integrity is involved is not only confusing, but somewhat artifi-
cial.100 
B. Two Modern (and Conflicting) Sets of Cases 
Two high-profile cases have found their way into the court sys-
tem, pressing the question of whether calling someone a liar in a 
public setting is defamatory. The first case, involving one of the Bill 
Cosby accusers, was dismissed.101 The second case, involving a 
basketball coach, reached the New York Court of Appeals, the 
state’s highest court, and the court ruled that the statement was 
defamatory.102 The following sections discuss each case separately. 
1. Accusing the Accuser—Hill v. Cosby 
The first of the Bill Cosby defamation lawsuits thus far, Hill v. 
Cosby, was dismissed by a federal judge who applied Pennsylvania 
substantive tort law.103 The plaintiff, Renita Hill, accused the le-
gendary comedian of a range of sexual assaults dating back to the 
1980s, when she first met Cosby in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
area while he was casting young women for a television show.104 A 
series of responses and rebuttals by Cosby, his lawyer, and his wife 
                                                                                                                            
standards that will allow a multitude of lower court tests to flourish.”); Edward M. 
Sussman, Note, Milkovich Revisited: “Saving” the Opinion Privilege, 41 DUKE L.J. 415, 421 
(1991) (arguing that the Milkovich decision did not actually change the law of defamation). 
99 Len Niehoff & Ashley Messenger, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Twenty-Five Years 
Later: The Slow, Quiet, and Troubled Demise of Liar Libel, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 467, 
468 (2016) (arguing that the Milkovich court’s “deeply and unworkably confused” 
opinion limited its subsequent application and influence). 
100 T.R. Hager, Recent Development: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: Lost Breathing 
Space—Supreme Court Stifles Freedom of Expression by Eliminating First Amendment 
Opinion Privilege, 65 TUL. L. REV. 944, 951–52 (1991) (arguing that the murky opinion’s 
“artificial dichotomy” between opinion and fact will stifle columnists and editorial 
writers and lead to a chilling effect for fear of liability). 
101 Hill v. Cosby, No. 15-CV-1658, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 
2016), aff’d, No. 16-1362, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22199 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2016). 
102 Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1001 (N.Y. 2014). 
103 Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795, at *25–27. 
104 See Complaint, Hill v. Cosby, No. GD-15-018156 (C.P Allegheny Cty. Oct. 14, 2015). 
The case was subsequently removed to federal court. See Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15795, at *1 n.1. 
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prompted Hill to retort in court, in a complaint averring that 
statements questioning her honesty were tantamount to defama-
tion.105 
Pennsylvania courts apply a seven-point list for a prima facie 
showing of defamation: (1) defamatory character of the statement; 
(2) publication by defendant; (3) application to plaintiff; (4) a de-
famatory understanding by the recipient; (5) understanding by re-
cipient of “intended” application to plaintiff; (6) special harm as a 
result of the publication; and (7) abuse of a conditional privilege.106 
The court also noted that the fact-opinion determination is a mat-
ter of law.107 
Though none of the three published statements explicitly refer 
to the plaintiff as a liar, she argued that they questioned her hones-
ty and implied that she was a liar.108 The statements included: 
• Martin Singer, a Cosby attorney/representative, 
responded to the plaintiff’s initial public media 
interview, casting doubt on the plaintiff and her 
motives for public statements, calling them 
“new, never-before heard claims from women, 
who have come forward in the past two weeks 
with unsubstantiated, fantastical stories . . . have 
escalated far past the point of absurdity. These 
brand new claims about alleged decades-old 
events are becoming increasingly ridiculous . . . 
It makes no sense that not one of these new 
women who just came forward for the first time 
ever asserted a legal claim back at the time they 
allege they had been sexually assaulted.”109 
• Cosby, himself, told the newspaper Florida Today: 
“I know people are tired of me not saying 
anything, but a guy doesn’t have to answer to 
innuendos. People should fact-check. People 
                                                                                                                            
105 Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795, at *1–2. Plaintiff also pleaded counts for false 
light and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
106 Id. at *5–6 (applying 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343 (West 2016)). 
107 Id. at *8. 
108 Id. at *12–13. 
109 Id. at *11–12. 
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shouldn’t have to go through that and shouldn’t 
answer to innuendos.”110 
• Cosby’s wife, Camille, published a letter to the 
editor in The Washington Post which stated that 
news organizations “failed to vet” the 
accusers.111 
The district court held that none of the statements constituted 
provable or disprovable fact and constituted opinion, immune from 
liability.112 The statements did not imply or allege undisclosed in-
formation.113 The court wrote: 
This [c]ourt does not find the Martin Singer State-
ment includes language which implies the existence 
of undisclosed defamatory facts about [the p]laintiff. 
As such, this [c]ourt considers the Martin Singer 
Statement to be purely an opinion proffered by an 
attorney who, while actively engaged in the zealous 
representation of his client, did not cross the line 
and defame the [p]laintiff.114 
The court held that the Florida Today statements lacked the 
element of harm and simply encouraged the public to “draw its 
own conclusions” about the allegations, and that Camille Cosby’s 
statements were more critical of the media, rather than the plain-
tiff.115 The court looked at all three statements together, concluding 
that they “did not lead to an inference that [the p]laintiff is a ‘liar 
and an extortionist.’”116 “Even assuming the veracity of all that 
[the p]laintiff has pled here, the three statements do not support a 
claim for defamation by Pennsylvania law,” the court concluded.117 
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, noting that some of 
the underlying statements were indeed based on stated facts even 
though a reasonable reader could come to the opposite conclu-
                                                                                                                            
110 Complaint, supra note 104, ¶ 41. 
111 Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795, at *12. 
112 Id. at *13–14. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at *15. 
115 Id. at *16–17. 
116 Id. at *18–19. 
117 Id. at *26. 
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sion.118 The court held that both the lawyer’s and Camille Cosby’s 
comments were clearly opinions.119 The responses to Hill’s accusa-
tions came “in the midst of a heated public dispute could not rea-
sonably be understood to imply the existence of any defamatory 
facts.”120 
2. Full-Court Press in Overtime—Davis v. Boeheim 
In the wake of the Jerry Sandusky child abuse scandal at Penn-
sylvania State University, two brothers in upstate New York al-
leged that they had been systematically molested as children by a 
long-time assistant basketball coach at Syracuse University in the 
1980s.121 The case against the assistant coach, Bernie Fine, resur-
rected decades-old allegations that had been quietly investigated, 
possibly ignored, and disregarded years earlier by the university 
and law enforcement.122 New allegations arose in 2011 and the na-
tional spotlight shone on Syracuse University, its basketball team, 
and celebrity coach Jim Boeheim.123 The story, initially reported by 
ESPN, created a firestorm of controversy, which included Coach 
                                                                                                                            
118 Hill v. Cosby, No. 16-1362, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22199, at *9, 11 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 
2016). 
119 Id. at *8. 
120 Id. at *11. 
121 Marlen Garcia, Syracuse Fires Associate Basketball Coach Fine, USA TODAY (Nov. 28, 
2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/story/2011-11-
27/syracuse-fires-bernie-fine/51426600/1 [https://perma.cc/FQ3Z-MLV4]; Leonard 
Greene, ‘Cuse Coach a ‘Perv,’ N.Y. POST (Nov. 18, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://nypost.com/ 
2011/11/18/cuse-coach-a-perv [https://perma.cc/7UJH-V3DU]; Pete Thamel, 
Syracuse’s Boeheim Stands by Assistant Accused of Abuse,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/sports/ncaabasketball/syracuse-assistant-is-
accused-of-sexual-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/E28B-2ANA]. 
122 Joe Nocera, Opinion, It’s Not Just Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/opinion/nocera-its-not-just-penn-state.html 
[https://perma.cc/R73Q-QJBW]. 
123 Erik Brady & Marlen Garcia, Jim Boeheim Under Fire Amid Fallout from Scandal, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 29, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/ 
mensbasketball/story/2011-11-28/syracuse-bernie-fine-boeheim-allegations/51444458/1 
[https://perma.cc/S52F-4WNT]; Lynn Zinser, As Case Widens, So Do Concerns for 
Syracuse, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/sports/ 
ncaabasketball/as-bernie-fine-case-widens-so-do-concerns-for-syracuse.html [https:// 
perma.cc/72PX-QYQW]. 
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Boeheim vociferously and publicly defending his longtime assistant 
coach during a post-game press conference.124 
Coach Boeheim questioned the accusers’ motives and charged 
them with lying.125 His statements prompted a defamation lawsuit 
in a case that had been dormant for decades; the underlying legal 
claims were rendered unavailing because the statute of limitations 
had long since expired.126 However, new characterizations of the 
accusers as liars served as the basis for the Davis-Lang brothers’ 
defamation claims, which eventually reached the New York Court 
of Appeals.127 
The plaintiffs, Robert Davis and his stepbrother Michael Lang, 
came forward to accuse Syracuse University assistant basketball 
coach Bernie Fine of systematically sexually molesting them as 
young boys in the 1980s.128 The allegations spurred both a universi-
ty investigation and widespread media attention, and raised ques-
tions about whether the university’s legendary basketball coach Jim 
Boeheim had knowledge of the alleged abuse.129 
After the controversy picked up steam, Coach Boeheim made 
several comments during a post-game press conference accusing 
the plaintiffs lying about their allegations and being motivated sole-
ly by money.130 These allegations, particularly accusing the broth-
ers of lying, harmed their reputations, they argued.131 The plaintiffs 
in the lawsuit isolated five specific statements made by Coach Boe-
heim: 
• This is alleged to have occurred . . . what? Twenty 
years ago? Am I in the right neighborhood? . . . 
So we are supposed to do what? Stop the presses 
                                                                                                                            
124 Joe Nocera, Opinion, Why Syracuse Isn’t Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/opinion/nocera-why-syracuse-isnt-penn-
state.html [https://perma.cc/SL6T-Q889]; Lynn Zinser, The Sudden Pivot at Syracuse, 
N.Y. TIMES,  (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/sports/at-syracuse-
a-sudden-pivot-leading-off.html [https://perma.cc/F9NW-J8S3]. 
125 See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1002 (N.Y. 2014). 
126 Id. at 1001. 
127 Id. at 1002–03. 
128 Id. at 1001. 
129 Id. at 1002. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1003. 
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26 years later? For a false allegation? For what I 
absolutely believe is a false allegation? I know 
[Davis is] lying about me seeing him in his hotel 
room. That’s a lie. If he’s going to tell one lie, 
I’m sure there’s a few more of them. 
• The Penn State thing came out and the kid behind 
this is trying to get money. He’s tried before. 
And now he’s trying again . . . That’s what this 
is about. Money. 
• It’s a bunch of a thousand lies that [Davis] has 
told . . . He supplied four names to the 
university that would corroborate his story. 
None of them did . . . there is only one side to 
this story. He is lying . . . .I believe they saw 
what happened at Penn State, and they are using 
ESPN to get money. That is what I believe. 
•  You don’t think it is a little funny that his cousin 
(relative) is coming forward? 
• “Boeheim stated that the timing of Lang’s 
decision to speak out about his abuse seemed “a 
little suspicious.”132 
The lawsuit was dismissed on a pre-trial motion and the appel-
late division affirmed the dismissal in a 3-2 decision; however, the 
Court of Appeals of New York reversed. 133 Although the court re-
cited the elements for defamation as a false statement of fact that 
exposes a person to “public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion or 
disgrace,”134 the court analyzed and discussed the application of 
the opinion privilege to the statements and quotes at issue.135 
The court wrote: “A defamatory statement of fact is in contrast 
to ‘pure opinion’ which under our laws is not actionable because 
‘[e]xpressions of opinion, as opposed to assertions of fact, are 
                                                                                                                            
132 Id. at 1005–06. 
133 See Davis v. Boeheim, 110 A.D.3d 1431, 1431 (N.Y. 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’ 
defamation claims as a matter of law under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(7) (McKinney 2016) 
because within the context a reasonable reader could construe the statements as opinion 
not provable facts), rev’d, 22 N.E.3d 999 (N.Y. 2014). 
134 Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1004 (quoting Thomas H. v. Paul B., 965 N.E.2d 939, 942 (N.Y. 
2012)). 
135 Id. at 1004–05. 
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deemed privileged and, no matter how offensive, cannot be the 
subject of an action for defamation.’”136 The court also reiterated 
the oft-quoted dicta from Gertz—that there is no such thing as a 
false idea.137 Of more importance, though, is the court’s reference 
to Ollman v. Evans, in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals laid 
out an important four-prong checklist for determining whether a 
published opinion should be afforded protection under the First 
Amendment.138 
The court also delved into the concept of “mixed opinion,” 
which is potentially actionable when it “implies that it is based 
upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those read-
ing or hearing it . . . .”139 As a matter of law, applying an “average 
person” standard, the court narrowed its analysis and application:   
This requirement that the facts upon which the opi-
nion is based are known “ensure[s] that the reader 
has the opportunity to assess the basis upon which 
the opinion was reached in order to draw [the read-
er’s] own conclusions concerning its validity” . . . 
.What differentiates an actionable mixed opinion 
from a privileged, pure opinion is, “the implication 
that the speaker knows certain facts, unknown to 
[the] audience, which support [the speaker’s] opi-
nion and are detrimental to the person” being dis-
cussed.140 
To determine whether a statement should be regarded as pure 
opinion or otherwise actionable, the court relied on New York’s 
recent precedent from Mann v. Abel.141 Mann sits atop a line of cas-
                                                                                                                            
136 Id. at 1004 (quoting Mann v. Abel, 885 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 2008)). 
137 Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974)). 
138 See id. (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Steinhilber v. 
Alphonse, 501 N.E.2d 550, 552 (N.Y. 1986)). 
139 Id. (quoting Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 552). 
140 Id. (quoting Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 553; Silsdorf v. Levine, 449 N.E.2d 716, 719 
(N.Y. 1983)). 
141 See id. at 1005 (citing 885 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 2008)). In Mann v. Abel, the court 
ruled that a newspaper column labeling plaintiff, among other things, a “political hatchet 
Mann” that was “leading the Town of Rye to destruction” should be protected opinion. 
Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 885. 
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es that apply and channel Milkovich to guide courts on opinion.142 
The Mann court developed a three-prong analysis—that is remi-
niscent of but does not cite Ollman—to determine whether a 
statement should be regarded as opinion: 
(1) [W]hether the specific language in question has a 
precise meaning which is readily understood; 
(2) [W]hether the statements can be proven true or 
false; and 
(3) [W]hether either the full context of the 
communication in which the statement appears 
or the broader social context and surrounding 
circumstances are such to signal . . . readers or 
listeners that what is being read or heard is likely 
to be opinion, not fact.143 
The statements that Coach Boeheim made during the press 
conference, the court of appeals held, satisfied the first two prongs 
under Mann because Boeheim’s statements were factual asser-
tions.144 Specifically, the court wrote: 
With respect to the first factor, Boeheim used spe-
cific, easily understood language to communicate 
that Davis and Lang lied, their motive was financial 
gain, and Davis had made prior similar statements 
for the same reason. These are clear statements of 
plaintiffs’ actions and the driving force for their al-
legations against Fine. Consideration of the second 
factor similarly weighs in favor of treating Boe-
heim’s statements as factual because the statements 
are capable of being proven true or false, as they 
                                                                                                                            
142 Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 886; see Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 
1275–77 (N.Y. 1991) (applying Milkovich to New York state libel law to hold that a critical 
letter to the editor of a science journal was protected because of the language and the 
context of the speech); see also Thomas H. v. Paul B., 965 N.E.2d 939, 942–43 (N.Y. 
2012) (applying Mann in a case involving allegations of child molestation); Brian v. 
Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130–31 (N.Y. 1995) (holding an op-ed column to be 
privileged as opinion). See generally Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1169–70 
(N.Y. 1993) (reversing a pre-answer motion to dismiss libel claim based on protected 
opinion privilege). 
143 Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 886. 
144 Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1006. 
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concern whether plaintiffs made false sexual abuse 
allegations against Fine in order to get money, and 
whether Davis had made false statements in the 
past.145 
The court also emphatically discounted these statements as 
rhetorical hyperbole.146  Courts consider the contextual analysis to 
be the “key” factor in determining whether opinion will be pro-
tected.147 Boeheim’s phraseology, “‘I believe,’ [was] insufficient to 
transform his statements into nonactionable pure opinion, because 
in context, a reasonable reader could view his statements as sup-
ported by undisclosed facts despite these denials,” the court 
wrote.148 
An analysis of the contextual factors also undercut the defen-
dant’s opinion argument because the court believed that Coach 
Boeheim was a well-respected, exalted authority in his community 
who “as head coach of the team appeared well placed to have in-
formation about the charges.”149 Coach Boeheim’s knowledge of 
the case and access to the university’s internal investigation and 
other documents and materials, which were generally unavailable 
to the public, suggested that he had additional or undisclosed 
knowledge upon which he spoke, the court noted.150 Furthermore, 
Coach Boeheim worked with the alleged abuser, Fine, for decades 
had intimate knowledge of this assistant, and claimed that he had 
some knowledge about the Davis brothers as well.151 
In conclusion, the court wrote: “There is a reasonable view of 
the claims upon which Davis and Lang would be entitled to recover 
for defamation; therefore, the complaint must be deemed to suffi-
                                                                                                                            
145 Id. 
146 Id. (“‘[L]iar,’ in context, where it reflects a mere denial of accusations, was personal 
opinion and rhetorical hyperbole. Our inquiry, however, does not rest on these two 
factors because the third factor in the analysis ‘is often the key consideration in 
categorizing a statement as fact or opinion.’” (quoting Indep. Living Aides, Inc. v. Maxi-
Aides, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 124, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Thomas H., 965 N.E.2d at 943). 
147 Id. (quoting Thomas H., 965 N.E.2d at 943). In a footnote, the court also wrote that it 
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ciently state a cause of action.”152 Thus, within the context of a 
sporting event press conference, off-the-cuff statements by a 
speaker regarded as a local celebrity with insider information could 
be defamatory.153 
III. APPLYING THE LAW OF DEFAMATION TO THE TERM 
‘LIAR’ 
Even though language and standards for defamation evolve and 
reflect contemporary values, it is highly unlikely that calling some-
one a liar will never be harmful to someone’s reputation. The term 
should not be totally removed from the list of potentially defamato-
ry language. Within certain settings, a false imputation of dishones-
ty can certainly harm someone’s reputation. But, determining the 
meaning, liability, and damages is no easy task. The current spate 
of cases, seemingly employing tort law to circumvent the statute of 
limitations on underlying tort issues or outdated criminal cases, 
does not appear on its face to be invoking defamation law in ge-
nuine, good-faith manners. 
The recent defamation cases pressing the question of whether 
there should be liability in calling someone a liar are difficult to ra-
tionalize. On one hand, contemporary statements criticizing accus-
ers who have no contemporary recourse in dated cases gives liti-
gants a back door to litigate the past in the present. On the other 
hand, being branded a liar for speaking out or stepping forward to 
report abuse or wrongdoing, even decades later, takes courage. The 
firestorm such accusers endure is part of the rigors of coming for-
ward. 
The law of defamation and the impact of a false statement have 
never been easy to rationalize. Quantifying harm to reputation can 
be speculative, at best, and as much as the landmark New York 
                                                                                                                            
152 Id. at 1008. 
153 Rather than pursue further litigation, the parties settled the case for an undisclosed 
sum in August 2015. See Chris Carlson, Syracuse, Jim Boeheim Settle Slander Lawsuit with 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan case has indemnified speakers, particularly 
the press, from a host of chilling libel suits by public officials and 
public figures, it has also added layers to the argument and raised 
questions about not only the meaning of actual malice, but its ap-
propriateness.154 Furthermore, the role of falsity in these discus-
sions of public issues is also part of a long tradition of balancing vi-
gorous, caustic debate on matters of public interest.155 
Any litigant or jurist looking for clarity on the defamatory im-
pact of the term “liar,” however, must dig deep for clear guidance. 
Milkovich adds to the confusion because every statement must be 
assessed within the context.156 Thus, there is no uniformity among 
courts—even with the specific charge of calling someone a liar. 
What is clear, however, is that accusers and aggrieved victims 
whose remedies are long since gone (because the statute of limita-
tions expired for the underlying civil or criminal liability) have been 
able to fashion at least prima facie defamation claims by luring par-
ties into a public discussion of the issues. 
In some ways, this approach is both a brilliant and opportunistic 
legal strategy. This is not intended to diminish the underlying alle-
gations, which the parties never pressed at the time for a variety of 
reasons. Unfortunately, with the passage of time, memories fade, 
evidence degrades, and witnesses disappear or die, which plays into 
the practical rationale for imposing a statute of limitations in the 
first place. 
The underlying allegations at the heart of these disputes are of 
the utmost seriousness and probably should have been thoroughly 
investigated and prosecuted at the time of the assaults. As is often 
the case, defense in both the courtroom and the court of public 
opinion often entails denials and casting the accusers in an unfa-
vorable light.157  Balancing these two competing interests, though, 
                                                                                                                            
154 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 815–16. 
155 See Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 N.W. 365, 367 (Iowa 1905). 
156 Niehoff & Messenger, supra note 99, at 468. 
157 For example, Flowers v. Carville illustrates the perils and difficulties that an accuser 
faces, and how the epithet “liar” among other retorts, can be actionable. See 310 F.3d 
1118 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the response against Gennifer Flowers, who stepped forward 
during the 1992 presidential campaign to allege that she had maintained a long-term 
extramarital relationship with then-candidate Bill Clinton, was labeled a liar and a fraud, 
and accused of doctoring tape recordings by a host of Clinton campaign staffers. Id. at 
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requires some legal guidance and that guidance comes from Milko-
vich, a Supreme Court precedent that is murky at best.158 
Thus, the context of the utterance “liar” is more dispositive 
than the word itself. Referring to a witness who testified as a liar 
may be actionable under Milkovich as a factual matter related to 
perjury, while a comedian such as Jon Stewart or John Oliver call-
ing a candidate a liar would not be.159 No reasonable person would 
expect facts to flow from a comedian. However, the context of a 
basketball coach’s off-the-cuff defense of a long-time assistant at a 
post-game press conference should not have the same credibility of 
a statement made under oath and threat of perjury.160 How much 
credibility should or could be afforded to a post-game press confe-
rence? 
The vast range of inconsistent court decisions does little to set-
tle the question. Recently, courts have come to opposite conclu-
sions in at least two high profile cases testing these issues. In cases 
against Bill Cosby, at least one court has rejected a defamation 
claim, while others are currently on appeal.161 In New York, the 
state’s high court held that a basketball coach’s spontaneous out-
burst at a post-game press conference, branding two accusers liars, 
could be held as defamatory and not opinion because of the weight 
of the speaker and the tenor of his comments. 
The Davis court cited one of New York’s more recent defama-
tion cases, Thomas H. v. Paul B., in which a plaintiff who had been 
accused of child molestation and rape argued that he had been de-
                                                                                                                            
1122–28. The court partially reversed a motion to dismiss, writing that Flowers deserved 
her day in court to prove that the statements about her were defamatory and published 
with actual malice. Id. at 1133. 
158 See Hager, supra note 100, at 951–52. 
159 See New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157–58 (Tex. 2004) (“In a case of 
parody or satire, courts must analyze the words at issue with detachment and dispassion, 
considering them in context and as a whole, as the reasonable reader would consider 
them.”). 
160 See generally Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 14-62649-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 
2015 U.S. Dist Lexis 38896, at *9–10 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015) (applying Davis v. Boeheim 
to an analysis of the context of a potentially defamatory statement, paying particular 
attention to the tabloid’s gossip pages). 
161 See sources cited supra note 5. 
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famed.162 Deciphering statements made in such a controversy may 
present a nearly “impossible” task for a court.163 The court more 
clearly articulated the hazards: 
Even when an accusation involves serious criminal 
conduct, differentiating between fact and opinion is 
not necessarily an easy endeavor. At first blush, a 
statement such as “plaintiff is a thief” certainly ap-
pears capable of being proven true or false. But the 
overall context in which such words are used may 
cloud their potentially defamatory nature.164 
If determining whether a statement questioning a person’s ho-
nesty in a traditional setting or in legacy media is confusing and po-
tentially conflicting,165 then modern media—particularly social 
media—is even worse because it is rife with mixed messages and a 
blurry context that courts are only beginning to rationalize.166 
Whether the context provided by social media platforms provides 
facts or opinion leaves courts vexed. One state trial court judge, 
ruling on social media posts that included an allegation that the 
plaintiff was a “liar,” noted the ease with which vitriolic and po-
tentially defamatory statements find an easy home online.167 
In Technovate LLC v. Fanelli, the court held that while com-
ments critical of the quality of the workmanship were protected as 
pure opinion, statements accusing the company’s owner of a 
                                                                                                                            
162 See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1004–07 (N.Y. 2014); see also Thomas H. v. 
Paul B., 965 N.E.2d 939, 941–42 (N.Y. 2012). 
163 Thomas H., 965 N.E.2d at 943. 
164 Id. at 942–43. 
165 See Niehoff & Messenger, supra note 99 (discussing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 
497 U.S. 1 (1990)); see also Bradford J. Kelley, Comment, Tortious Tweets: A Practical 
Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559, 588 
(2013) (“Trial courts will be better served to continue to apply traditional defamation 
law, regardless of the publication medium.”). 
166 See Joshua Azriel & Charles Mayo, Fifty Years After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
and Forty Years After Gertz v. Welch: How These Twentieth Century Supreme Court Rulings 
Impact Twenty-First Century Online Social Media Libel Claims, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
191 (2014). 
167 Technovate LLC v. Fanelli, No. 003713/15, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3394, at *11–12 
(Civ. Ct. Sept. 10, 2015). 
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“scam” and being “a liar” were sufficiently factual and harmful.168 
The court awarded the plaintiff $1,000 in damages.169 The new 
medium, and thus the context, provides courts with great difficulty 
assessing defamation. The court explained: 
The courts have been struggling with the applica-
tion of the traditional analysis of defamation to the 
Internet. As noted in Sandals Resorts International 
Ltd. v. Google, Inc., the culture of the Internet is cha-
racterized by a more freewheeling, anything-goes 
style of writing where bulletin boards and chat 
rooms may be the repository of a wide range of ca-
sual, emotive, and imprecise speech where the read-
ers of the offensive statements do not necessarily 
attribute to them the same level of credence they 
would to statements made in other contexts. On-line 
speech often is characterized by the use of slang, 
grammatical mistakes, spelling errors, and a general 
lack of coherence. Many, if not, all of which exist in 
defendant’s postings.170 
In one of the first expositions on defamatory liability associated 
with Twitter, legal columnist Julie Hilden described how the lines 
between opinion and fact “blur” on the social media platform.171 
Twitter’s immediacy and brevity, as well as the use of slang and 
direct contact with an infinite audience, differentiate the platform 
from traditional media.172 She wrote: 
To try to get the protection of the privilege for opi-
nion based on disclosed fact, however, defendants 
may ask courts to view certain sets of tweets—those 
that appeared closely enough to each other in time 
                                                                                                                            
168 Id. at *4, *16–17. (“[D]efendant’s statements in regard to his honesty in business 
transactions qualified as defamation per se entitling him to general damages without proof 
of special harm.”). 
169 Id. at *17. 
170 Id. at *10 (citation omitted). 
171 Julie Hilden, Should the Law Treat Defamatory Tweets the Same Way as it Treats 
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to make it likely that they were read together by fol-
lowers—as, in effect, one statement. In my view, 
that seems like a reasonable thing for a court to do. 
(Here, too, empirical evidence could be gathered, by 
contacting followers—or a sample of them—to see 
if they did, indeed, read every one of a series of re-
lated tweets, or if they just read the lone tweet that 
the plaintiff has now put at issue.)173 
While Hilden offered a range of solutions, including declaring 
socially accepted textual or typographical symbolism, such as color-
coding statements intended to be humorous or sarcastic, or the 
creation of a symbol to indicate opinion like the four-character ab-
breviation of “In My Humble Opinion” (“IMHO”) which some-
times prefaces statements, Hilden predicted a future rife with more 
libel lawsuits.174 Perhaps Hilden was writing sarcastically, but much 
like the message in cyberspace, the tone did not fully translate. 
Though media accounts have publicized a handful of high-
profile celebrity Twitter defamation suits, judicial opinions and 
guidance on these “twibel” cases are scant.175 One of the first 
Twitter libel lawsuits involved rock star Courtney Love, who 
wrote, among other tweets, that a designer who she had a tiff with 
was a prostitute who had stolen from her.176 In a series of tweets, 
Love also accused the plaintiff of drug use and losing custody of a 
child.177 Thus, the lying epithet, likely played a minor role in the 
litigation compared to the other libels. But it was still a component 
of the lawsuit and a $430,000 settlement, which a California ap-
peals court affirmed, ruling that the publicly fought feud was not a 
matter of public interest worthy of dismissal on First Amendment 
grounds.178 
                                                                                                                            
173 Id. 
174 Id. Law professor Lili Levi humorously coined the word “twibel” to describe libel 
lawsuits emanating from Twitter. See Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
1531, 1574–75 (2012) (discussing libel lawsuits based on tweets by Courtney Love and 
Kim Kardashian). 
175 Levi, supra note 174. 
176 See Simorangkir v. Cobain, No. B254895, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1442, at *7–
8 (Feb. 26, 2015). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at *16–19. 
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One scholar analyzing the tensions relating to social media 
wrote: 
Because of the informal nature of Twitter, reasona-
ble readers of most Twitter feeds “do not under-
stand ‘tweets’ to be conveying factual informa-
tion.” In evaluating whether Love’s comments were 
factual (and therefore likely libelous), or opinion 
(which is more protected and less likely libelous), 
the California Courts examined the “context, in-
cluding the nature of the platform.” Thus, because 
opinion-based speech receives much greater First 
Amendment protection than fact-based speech, this 
will be a crucial point of analysis in determining 
whether tweets are defamatory.179 
Lying and imputing dishonesty also infiltrates social media, 
such as Facebook,180 and consumer complaint websites, which rais-
es questions of common law defamation as well as other issues, 
such as trade disparagement and intellectual property infringe-
ment.181 The review website Yelp has tested the old law for reputa-
tion management within a modern media context.182 
An online post calling a realtor a “liar” was among the state-
ments challenged in a defamation lawsuit, Shiamili v. Real Estate 
                                                                                                                            
179 Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and its Remedies Look Like in the 
Age of Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 433, 472–73 (2013) (citing Sam Bayard, First Twitter 
Libel Suit, Starring Courtney Love, DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2009), 
http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2009/sam-bayard/first-twitter-libel-suit-starring-courtney-
love [https://perma.cc/YU46-XJYT]). 
180 See generally Armstrong v. Shirvell, 596 Fed. App’x 433 (6th Cir. 2015); Vizant 
Techs., LLC. V. Whitchurch, No. 15-431, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2112 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 
2016); Runyan v. Fey, No. 15-CV-00009-RBJ-CBS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170645 (D. 
Colo. Dec. 22, 2015). 
181 See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, Online Reputation Management in Attorney 
Regulation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97 (2016). 
182 While websites that allow third-parties or users to post or publish information on the 
platform are immune from liability under section 230 of Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”), the authors of critical commentary have found themselves in court defending 
their statements. See Braverman v. Yelp Inc., No. 158299, slip op. at 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Feb. 24, 2014), aff’d, 128 A.D.3d 568 (N.Y. 2015); see also DERIGAN SILVER, Defamation, 
in SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE LAW: A GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNICATION STUDENTS AND 
PROFESSIONALS 23, 44 (Daxton R. Stewart ed., 2013) (suggesting that critical statements 
posted on Yelp might be afforded protection under the fair comment privilege). 
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Group of New York, Inc., which named a New York City real estate 
industry website among the defendants.183 Because of section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), the case against 
the website was dismissed because it was viewed as a passive con-
duit for third-party comments.184 However, the court also added 
that no reasonable reader could construe the statements, which 
were undoubtedly offensive, as fact or defamatory.185 Some of 
those statements might have even been construed as satirical.186 
Meanwhile, a Washington state appellate court dismissed online 
postings which included a list of abusive insults, including “liar” 
because no reasonable viewer could construe the statements as fac-
tual, not opinion.187 Even a website named “liarscheatersus.com,” 
which encouraged people to post comments about failed relation-
ships, could be viewed as rhetorical hyperbole and opinion.188 
In the modern world, perhaps courts can find refuge with old 
legal standards. Milkovich has never been an easy precedent to ap-
ply, except perhaps with its Hustler v. Falwell rhetorical hyperbole 
rationale (the more outrageous the epithet, the less reasonable it is 
to accept for its truthfulness).189 Applying the Ollman prongs may 
be useful: (1) does the language have a precise meaning; (2) can the 
language used be proven true or false; and (3) what is the full con-
text of the statement?190 Though the Ollman test may seem more 
accessible and workable in determining whether a statement should 
be regarded as factual or pure opinion, especially in an academic 
setting, such an analysis may be of little consolation to a potential 
                                                                                                                            
183 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011). 
184 Id. at 1018–19. This was the New York Court of Appeals’ first ruling on the CDA. 
See id. at 1020. 
185 Id. at 1019–20. 
186 Id. 
187 See Life Designs Ranch, Inc. v. Sommer, 364 P.3d 129, 135–36 (Wash. 2015). 
188 Couloute v. Ryncarz, No. 11-CV-5986 (HB), 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20534, *18–20 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (“Defendants note, liarscheatersus.com is ‘specifically intended 
to provide a forum for people to air their grievances about dishonest partners.’ The 
average reader would know that the comments are ‘emotionally charged rhetoric’ and the 
‘opinions of disappointed lovers.’ Of course the internet makes it more likely that a 
greater number of people will read comments such as these, and thereby amplify the 
impact they may have on a person, but this does not change the underlying nature of the 
comments themselves.”). 
189 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990). 
190 Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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plaintiff who has just been branded a liar in a speech, a press confe-
rence, an editorial, or a post on social media. 
A wholesale judicial declaration that social media or online 
comments sections should never be taken seriously as factual, or 
that no reasonable person should view such areas as fact, would 
neuter defamation law. Perhaps the only real solace a potential de-
famation plaintiff could take rests in the fact that being branded a 
“liar” in tweets, comments, or reviews is often accompanied by 
more derogatory and damaging statements. But, this is hardly a vi-
able judicial standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of defamation revolves around the meaning of words. 
Language, particularly that which lowers someone’s esteem in 
their community or causes harm to his or her reputation, must be 
weighed against the context of that utterance. Even with the evolu-
tion of language, perhaps no epithet still tests these issues more 
than calling someone a liar. As much as observers might want a 
simple yes/no answer regarding liability surrounding the word liar, 
there is no one-size-fits-all determination of liability or harm. 
Courts wrestling with these issues in interpersonal communica-
tions, traditional legacy media (such as newspapers or broadcas-
ters), and modern social media must pay particular attention to the 
context in which the speech emerged. 
A spate of recent cases testing the liability of the term liar has 
emerged amid several high-profile public scandals. The plaintiffs in 
these cases, victims of abuses for which the statute of limitations 
had long since expired, have found new venues to seek justice 
through the tort law of defamation—litigating the liability and 
harm associated with being called a liar. While defamation law pro-
tects a person’s reputation, it should not be used as a back door 
when other civil and criminal remedies have expired. Long-
standing Supreme Court precedent reiterates the importance of 
context in this analysis because sometimes calling someone a liar is 
nothing more than opinion. Thus, in many venues, calling someone 
a liar may be offensive or hurtful, but falls short of being defamato-
ry. And, that is the truth. 
